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IMRE DOBÁK1 
Surveillance, information gathering – changing environment 
Megfigyelés, információgyűjtés – változó környezet 
Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to provide insight to the changes of surveillance and 
technical type of information gathering that have occurred at international level 
over the past time, and to highlight the importance of the topic. Nowadays, the 
changes related to this issue are extremely dynamic, because the governments 
and their national security services and law enforcement organizations have been 
trying to give prompt answers to those challenges, risks and threats that negative-
ly affected the security. 
Keywords: security, surveillance, secret information gathering 
Absztrakt 
Jelen tanulmány célja, hogy rávilágítson a technikai típusú információgyűjtés, 
megfigyelés jelentőségére, és az elmúlt időszakban nemzetközi szinten lezajlott 
változásokra. A kérdéskörben látható változások napjainkban rendkívül dinamiku-
sak, hiszen a biztonságot negatívan befolyásoló kihívásokra, kockázatokra, 
fenyegetésekre a kormányok (és biztonsági szervezeteik) igyekeztek rövid időn 
belül válaszokat adni.   
Kulcsszavak: biztonság, megfigyelés, titkos információgyűjtés 
INTRODUCTION 
In the recent years, significant changes have taken place in the information gathering and 
lawful interception of national security and law enforcement services. The previous tradi-
tional, technical type of information gathering solutions and methods have changed accord-
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ing to the technical environment and security challenges, so the concerned organizations 
have taken steps to revise their capabilities, practices and laws. The cyber and the tech-
nical nature surveillance have become more important and the usage of these indispensa-
ble capabilities has increased. Their existence and application nowadays are widely known 
too, because of the legal frameworks and also due to the Snowden revelations
2
 (2013). 
All these changes make it worthwhile to review briefly the topic, and highlight its im-
portance. The examination of the subject relies on such international public sources where 
we mainly meet with the legal approaches of information gathering (e.g. regulation of na-
tional security / law enforcement) and right to privacy or with the questions of increasingly 
dominant cyberspace. The issue can be considered to be highly multidisciplinary after its 
close examination, different areas of technical-, social-, and legal sciences may also ap-
pear.  
There are two main factors behind the relevance of the topic: namely the intensified in-
telligence and security information needs related to terrorism threats, and the emergence 
and lawful applicability of the new information gathering capabilities (methods) in the tech-
nological environment. Looking out the European scene and excluding the national security 
or law enforcement differences, this paper intends to have a brief overview of some rele-
vant points of the topic. 
SOME ASPECTS OF THE ISSUE 
It is worth to emphasize that legal regulations - including the national level rules for surveil-
lance practices for both law enforcement and national security - are highly complex and 
different in some details. It is also a fact that (secret) information gathering for the purposes 
of the national security (intelligence) is not to be confused with the lawful interception
3
 of 
assigned authorities acting for law enforcement (e.g. police) purposes. Even though there 
might be some similarities related to technical skills and methods, but their tasks – e.g. 
concerning the levels of security issues and interests - are different. Rules of information 
gathering also may show differences between law enforcement and national security prac-
tices in respect of different countries. On this field, the phenomenon of terrorism as a spe-
cific threat encouraged to rethink the surveillance practices and its legal background in the 
digital era. In the background, there is also a wide range of social debates about the ques-
tion of security vs. protection of fundamental rights. These are well reflected in the related 
international documents, in the scientific analyses and statements appearing on the politi-
cal scene. 
                                                 
2
See: The Guardian, NSA files: Decoded, available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/nov/01/snowden-nsa-files-surveillance-
revelations-decoded#section/1 (accessed August 21, 2017) 
3
„Lawful interception (LI) is a security process in which a service provider or network operator collects 
and provides law enforcement officials with intercepted communications of private individuals or organ-
izations.” Cited from: http://www.etsi.org/technologies-clusters/technologies/lawful-interception (ac-
cessed August 10, 2017) 
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In the meantime, the information and communications technology (ICT) is constantly 
evolving, due to the Internet, it is by its nature, a cross-border phenomenon. Cyberspace 
comes to the forefront, it gets a new interpretation concerning the challenges, risks and 
threats that affect security and it requires proper responses from security agencies. It is 
also a fact that ICT is a decisive factor in the whole society, which besides to peaceful- 
minded people is also open
4
 to both national security threats and illegal activities.  
In the changing security environment, the threats come from unpredictable locations, 
from national territory or from remote geographic areas. Let’s just think to the intensifying 
terrorism
5
, the organized crime, the various areas of cybercrime or even the emergence of 
some economic and financial problems. The other side of the coin is that, these problems 
demand prompt actions of law enforcement agencies and security services in surveillance, 
lawful interception and the cybersecurity activities. 
KEY ISSUES OF THE PAST YEARS 
In recent years, the effects of security policy events, the technological advancement or the 
national security leaks
6
 have highlighted several key factors as well. This publication is 
intending to outline them below. 
— Leaks: The US intelligence scandal emerged in 2013 revealed that the technical 
capabilities of our age allow bulk information gathering regardless of state or geo-
graphical boundaries.
7
 It has raised several debates including the surveillance in 
the expanding cyberspace, the role of the state in protecting its national security, 
the place and role of corporate actors and last but not least, the issues of the right 
to privacy. 
— Expansion role of cyberspace: After the turn of the millennium, the security needs 
related to the cyberspace has expanded and became dominant. It has created 
new challenges as the ground of "information gathering" / "lawful interception" and 
as a place of cybersecurity for the state and other actors. It can be seen from pub-
                                                 
4
Boda J. - Dobák I.: A technikai-műszaki nemzetbiztonsági szolgálatok és feladatok jelentősége a 21. 
században, In: Boda József, Dobák Imre (ed.) A nemzetbiztonság technikai kihívásai a 21. században, 
Bp., NKE Szolgáltató Nonprofit Kft, 2015.  
5
The use of the Internet for terrorist purposes, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna, UN, 
September 2012., available at: 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Use_of_Internet_for_Terrorist_Purposes.pdf (accessed 
July  15, 2017) 
6
See wikileaks (e.g. Vault 7, or Spy Files) documents, available at: https://wikileaks.org/+-Intelligence-
+.html 
7
We have seen examples not only by the NSA (US), but in the UK (GCHQ), in Germany (BND) or "the 
French DGSE has allegedly placed … interceptors on underwater cables out of its military base in 
Djibouti". See: Zygmunt Bauman, Didier Bigo, Paulo Esteves, Elspeth Guild, Vivienne Jabri, David 
Lyon, R. B. J. Walker; After Snowden: Rethinking the Impact of Surveillance, International Political 
Sociology, Volume 8, Issue 2, 1 June 2014, p. 121–144, https://doi.org/10.1111/ips.12048 
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lic sources as well that concerning the cyberspace as a new conflict zone many 
countries have formed their strategies and organizations for cyber issues (e.g. 
cyber security, cyber intelligence...).  
The open nature of the Internet and the cross-border nature of infocommunication 
systems are the key factors for security organizations, where it is often difficult to 
determine where the relevant threats come from. Managing these threats can 
often go beyond the state, for example at the theme of counter-terrorism, where 
the cyberspace has a special relevance. (As the related UN document defined 
"the Internet is often utilized to promote and support acts of terrorism", as for "pro-
paganda (including recruitment, radicalization and incitement to terrorism); 
financing; training; planning (including through secret communication and open-
source information); execution; and cyberattacks.")
8
 
— Regulatory environment: Nowadays, it is commonly known that in democratic 
countries, the national security services are oversighted and controlled by external 
control mechanisms and the frameworks for the secret information gathering were 
codified in laws.
9
 Legitimate and legally permitted interception of telecommunica-
tion systems is present on the European stage since 1995 in accordance with the 
resolution of the EU Council. This decision states that „the legally authorized in-
terception of telecommunications is an important tool for protecting the national in-
terest, especially in case of national security and investigation of serious crime”
10
.  
In addition to the national legislation, international technical standards were de-
veloped and have taken steps to follow the changes of technological environment 
(e.g. cloud
11
). The European level for the development of the international stand-
ards of lawful interception reinforced the same technological bases of surveillance 
capabilities as well as the accountability thereby indirectly strengthened the pro-
tection of privacy. Standards also operate as links to the infocommunication com-
panies, setting a specific framework for cooperation. The standards of ETSI (Eu-
                                                 
8
The use of the Internet for terrorist purposes. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna, UN, 
September 2012. p.3. available at: 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Use_of_Internet_for_Terrorist_Purposes.pdf (downloaded 
August 15, 2017) 
9
See: Dobák Imre: Technikai típusú információgyűjtés a változó biztonsági kihívások tükrében, Had-
mérnök XII/2, 2017. p. 236, availableat: http://hadmernok.hu/172_19_dobak.pdf (downloaded: July   
15, 2017) 
10
Council Resolution, of 17 January 1995 on the lawful interception of telecommunications, (96/C 
329/01), Official Journal of the European Communities C 329, 4.11.1996. Volume 39, ISSN 0378-6986 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/%20PDF/?uri=OJ:C:1996:329:FULL&from=EN (down-
loaded: July 15, 2017) 
11
Lawful Interception (LI); Cloud/Virtual Services for Lawful Interception (LI) and Retained Data (RD)  
available at: 
http://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_tr/101500_101599/101567/01.01.01_60/tr_101567
v010101p.pdf (accessed July  15, 2017) 
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ropean Telecommunications Standards Institute) can provide a consistent inter-
pretation between service providers and law enforcement or even national securi-
ty authorities. ITU (International Telecommunication Union) also draws attention to 
the need for law enforcement technologies based on the exact international 
standards. 
— Data collecting: Following the Snowden case, a wide range of studies examined 
the issues, and outlined some important focus points: the question of the mass 
data surveillance
12
, the issue of domestic and foreign data collection
13
, the com-
plexity of national security and law enforcement information gathering as well as 
the social sensitivity related to information gathering. In the case of metadata
14
, 
the question of collecting, storing and also the ability of processing them has 
raised some problems considering the fact that without being analysed and evalu-
ated, these data are basically only data sets. As the UN General Assembly (2016) 
noting "while metadata can provide benefits, certain types of metadata, when ag-
gregated, can reveal personal information and can give an insight into an individ-
ual’s behaviour, social relationships, private preferences and identity". It is a ques-
tion that after analysing these mass data, how deep it may violate the rights of pri-
vacy of a given person as detailed information can be obtained about his habits 
and behaviour.
15
  
— Encryption: Nowadays, the new encryption solutions are widely available not only 
for the state actors, but also for business and people. On the other hand, its wide-
spread use has a determining affect to the effectiveness of the surveillance. In the 
beginning of this century, the governments’ organizations carrying out their lawful 
interception and information gathering tasks have already met with a growing 
technical level of encryption
16
, where the service providers were increasingly re-
                                                 
12
 Concerning the meaning of „mass surveillance” it is worth to quote the mentioned EU study: „It refers 
broadly to the bulk access and/or collection of many users’ communications without prior suspicion of 
individual targets. Therefore, mass surveillance involves no individual target, no prior suspicion, is not 
time bound and due to the technology employed, potentially limitless." Cited from: Susan Morgan: 
“Lawful Interception and Government Access to User Data: Designing a Rights-Respecting Model” 
(Jan. 2016). IHRB p.7. 
13
 Often cited source is the PCLOB (Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board) Report on the Surveil-
lance Program Operated Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (US 
practice) (2014) which describes in detail the two-main type of foreign PCLOB information gathering 
(„downstream” and “upstream”), available at: https://www.nsa.gov/about/civil-
liberties/resources/assets/files/pclob_section_702_report.pdf (accessed: May 20, 2017) 
14
 The metadata means the non-communication data (e.g. number, e-mail address, location, time, 
network, service provider, etc.) 
15
 Concerning the UK Investigatory Power Bill see Glyn Moody writings. Available at: 
http://arstechnica.co.uk/tech-policy/2016/11/investigatory-powers-act-privacy-disaster-waiting-to-
happen/  or https://arstechnica.co.uk/tech-policy/2016/03/revised-snoopers-charter-ignores-key-
criticisms-widens-police-powers-further/(accessed: May 20, 2017) 
16
 In Europe, the attention was focused to the encrypted communications after the terrorist acts (2015) 
in Paris, assuming that it could be particularly suitable for concealing information between terrorists 
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luctant to support governments' secret requests for data as well. Due to the chal-
lenges caused by encryption, and the failure of lawful access to information (Go-
ing Dark
17
) there has been an increasing pressure on the state security organiza-
tions. In the field of responses, as a special example, the previous US practice 
could be mentioned, when they took steps to hold its decoding capabilities (e.g. a 
" key escrow" system
18
). But in the recent years, the specific information gathering 
solutions (e.g. hacking) come to the fore more likely, or the co-operation with ser-
vice providers gets a greater role.
19
 
— Providers-Corporate actors: Nowadays, the providers bear an indispensable part 
in surveillance, since a huge bulk of data and the communication itself can be 
found in the system of infocommunication service providers
20
. Their development 
activities are continuous and extremely fast, moreover their interests are influ-
enced by economic factors. Geographically, many of their services are cross-
border (e.g. Internet and Internet-based services), but their co-operation obliga-
tions are basically based on (national) laws, which can result imbalances. They 
are in an intermediate role in information gathering/lawful interception cooperation 
with the states. On one hand, their co-operation is extremely important for the se-
curity agencies performing the duties of governments, and on the other hand, as a 
provider, its duty is to protect the communication of their users (right to privacy). 
Cooperation may also have some negative business impacts, and it may lead to 
reduce the users' confidence in service providers: e.g. the users will not use the 
                                                                                                                           
before the authorities. The “encryption” debate came to the fore in 2015, when some major communi-
cations services providers have enabled to use the end-to-end encryption in their applications. See: 
Don’t Panic, Making Progress on the “Going Dark”, Debate February 1, 2016, The Berkman Center for 
Internet and Society at Harvard University, available at: 
https://cyber.harvard.edu/pubrelease/dont-
panic/Dont_Panic_Making_Progress_on_Going_Dark_Debate.pdf (access: August 25. 2017)   
17
See: James B. Comey: Going Dark: Are Technology, Privacy, and Public Safety on a Collision 
Course? October 16, 2014 available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/583137/IPOL_STU(2017)583137_EN.pdf   
(access: August 05. 2017) 
18
See: Mirja GUTHEIL, Quentin LIGER, Aurélie HEETMAN, James EAGER, Max CRAWFORD: Legal 
Frameworks for Hacking by Law Enforcement: Identification, Evaluation and Comparison of Practices, 
European Union, 2017, p.18.  
19
Some intelligence services ... work on a very large scale and use voluntary or forced collaborations 
with private providers … and telecommunication companies”. See: Zygmunt Bauman, Didier Bigo, 
Paulo Esteves, Elspeth Guild, Vivienne Jabri, David Lyon, R. B. J. Walker; After Snowden: Rethinking 
the Impact of Surveillance, International Political Sociology, Volume 8, Issue 2, 1 June 2014, p. 121–
144, https://doi.org/10.1111/ips.12048 
20
As the UN General Assembly (2016) notes: "that the increasing capabilities of business enterprises 
to collect, process and  use  personal  data  can  pose  a  risk  to  the  enjoyment  of  the  right  to 
privacy in the digital age". See: UN General Assembly, 16 November 2016 A/C.3/71/L.39/Rev.1, avail-
able at: https://www.accessnow.org/cms/assets/uploads/2016/09/privacy-resolution-2016-UNGA.pdf 
(downloaded: 2017.08.22.) 
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technology if they do not trust in its security (see: technology trust deficit).
21
. In re-
cent years, we have seen many examples of these, let's think of the cooperation 
between IT service providers and security agencies in the mass data collection of 
the US, or as a counter-example the rejection of security service providers' re-
quest by the service providers (using encryption, Apple vs. FBI). 
— Privacy: Members of the society necessarily use communication technologies in 
their daily lives and to protect their privacy is a basic requirement. Nevertheless, 
among the peaceful minded members of the society, those ones can also be pre-
sent who threaten the security of the nation (criminals, terrorists), so their pres-
ence requires the response of the security forces. In the last third of the 20th cen-
tury, we could see the coming into force of the public regulations of secret ser-
vices, the strengthening of the external overview system in the democratic socie-
ties and also the debates about the surveillance vs. protection of privacy.  
The regulated state level of information collection has been already widely ac-
cepted by the society, but debates about the extent of information gathering often 
arise. As it is in the above cited relevant EU study, the law protects the private 
communications but „…  in specific and defined circumstances, such as those re-
lated to national security threats or other narrowly defined situations of public safe-
ty or crime prevention, governments may legitimately restrict the right and intrude 
on individual privacy provided a number of specific conditions are met.”
22
 It is a 
fact, that the surveillance activity must have a comprehensive legal and profes-
sional framework, along which - according to democratic standards - the relevant 
national security and intelligence organizations can operate and perform their ac-
tivities. The UN General Assembly has already called upon the States in 2016: "to  
review  their  procedures,  practices  and  legislation  regarding  the surveillance  
of  communications,  their  interception  and  the  collection  of  personal data,  in-
cluding  mass  surveillance,  interception  and  collection,  with  a  view  to uphold-
ing the right to privacy by ensuring the full and effective implementation of all their 
obligations under international human rights law".
23
 
As a specific phenomenon, the periodic shift of social sensitivity concerning the 
secret organizations could also be observed. This attitude may change when such 
an event happens which has a negative impact on security (the European terrorist 
acts of recent years might serve as good examples). After these events, the secu-
                                                 
21
See: KRIS, D. S. (2016). Trends and predictions in foreign intelligence surveillance: The FAA and 
beyond. Journal of National Security Law & Policy, 8(3), p.6 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/1831706283?accountid=42933  
22
Susan Morgan: “Lawful Interception and Government Access to User Data: Designing a Rights-
Respecting Model” (Jan. 2016). p.11. 
23
16 November 2016 A/C.3/71/L.39/Rev.1, available at: 
https://www.accessnow.org/cms/assets/uploads/2016/09/privacy-resolution-2016-
UNGA.pdf(downloaded: 2017.08.22.) 
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rity needs of the society (and state) and also the role of potential information gath-
ering on technical field can increase and it may even affect the activity and struc-
ture of the concerned organizations. 
RESPONSES TO CHALLENGES IN OUR DAYS 
As an obligation, the states have to guarantee the national security of the concerned coun-
try. Along their tasks, it may appear the information needs of law enforcement agencies 
and national security that can use information gathering activities including technical ele-
ments as well. This activity is not new on the European stage and - irrespective of any 
political systems - their application goes back to the beginning of the 20th century. Howev-
er, beyond the traditional forms (e.g. wiretapping), the actual information gathering solu-
tions can be largely related to cyberspace. The protection of privacy on the surveillance / 
secret information gathering stay important. As the Institute for Human Rights and Busi-
ness defines "Intercepting or monitoring communications is an intrusive process into some-
one’s privacy and therefore a strict legal framework should govern such actions to prevent 
arbitrary violations of rights such as privacy and freedom of expression”.
24
 
RESPONSES: 
The task of the national security services is to respond efficiently to different threats along 
their lawful operations, their tasks and their capabilities, meanwhile they take into account 
the constantly changing technical environment and they also provide the necessary infor-
mation through their secret (and open) information gathering activities.  
— Actors in the technological environment are facing with masses of information (Big 
Data). The everyday lives of users have been intertwined with digital communica-
tion and a huge amount of (offline and online) data arises because of it. This in-
formation set contains also those data which can help the authorized security or-
ganizations to achieve efficiently theirs tasks. Thus, these organizations under-
standably take steps to use the modern surveillance and interception technolo-
gies. While the most up-to-date tools are being used for illegal activities, the na-
tional security organizations have to be prepared in long-term to create their lawful 
interception capabilities. 
— After 2013, the defense against the intelligence of other states amplified the de-
fensive reflexes of European states (e.g. cyber security) at first and the issue of 
data protection (e.g. Safe Harbor
25
) became a priority. In the meantime, the terror-
ist acts occurring in Europe highlighted the importance of applying the modern 
                                                 
24
Susan Morgan: “Lawful Interception and Government Access to User Data: Designing a Rights-
Respecting Model” (Jan. 2016). p.6.) 
25
What is 'safe harbour' and why did the EUCJ just declare it invalid? available 
at:https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/oct/06/safe-harbour-european-court-declare-invalid-
data-protection (downloaded: August 06, 2017.) 
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surveillance technologies in relation to the tasks of state security services. Several 
countries across Europe have reviewed their relevant rules and have taken steps 
to increase their applicability in the fight against terrorism.
26
  
— Security threats, challenges and also the evolving technological environment have 
enhanced the significance of national and international level cooperation as well. 
Regarding the gathering information, it is clear that serving information needs 
have already been closely linked to the external infocommunication environment. 
At international levels, it became visible a more effective response to the cyber 
threats (increased cyber security). 
— The wide range of corporate environment helps to operate and develop the gov-
ernments' surveillance solutions with its infocommunication-based developments. 
All of these are present in both national security and law enforcement tasks. Due 
to the use of modern technologies and the necessary specialists and also by rea-
son of other respects, the companies often support this field as an outsourcing ac-
                                                 
26
The revision of the national legislation of secret information gathering in Europe has begun as a 
result of the recent terrorist attacks in Europe. For example: 
- In the United Kingdom, it has come to the fore that the intelligence services should get more 
possibilities
26
 to fight against terrorism in 2015.
26
 There was an extended professional debate be-
fore the Investigatory Powers Act, which aimed mostly at the telephone companies and Internet 
Service Provider, to create the obligation to store (for a year) the so-called Internet Connection 
Records (ICRs) in order the relevant security services could have access to the records upon 
request. Some opponents attacked it because of their extremely wide licenses. The government, 
however, had maintained its vision and the law was adopted at the end of 2016 as the main legal 
basis for the surveillance by law enforcement and the security and intelligence services. See: 
MOODY, Glyn - 17/11/2016, Why the Investigatory Powers Act is a privacy disaster waiting to 
happen, http://arstechnica.co.uk/tech-policy/2016/11/investigatory-powers-act-privacy-disaster-
waiting-to-happen/ (downloaded: April 25, 2017) or GRIFFIN, Andrew: Snoopers’ Charter: The-
resa May to push huge new spying powers through Parliament, despite major report concluding 
they are not needed, 11 June 2015 http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-
tech/news/snoopers-charter-theresa-may-to-push-huge-new-spying-powers-through-parliament-
despite-major-report-10313042.html (downloaded: July 10, 2017) 
- In Russia, the year of 2016 was also a turning point in the issue of information gathering based 
on Internet technology. According to media sources, in the country, in the mid-2016, several anti-
terrorist laws amendments were approved. The anti-encryption and data retention law (Yarovaya 
Law) deal with those telecommunications providers, that have to store all telephone conversa-
tions and text messages for six months, and the metadata of calls for three years.
26
 The “organ-
izers of information distribution on the Internet” (so web resources) have to store the information 
for one year. Under the Law “organizers of information distribution on the Internet” (e.g. websites 
messenger apps, social networks, e-mail clients) that encrypts their data, "are required to help 
Russia's Federal Security Service decipher any message sent by its users." Ronald Bailey: Is 
Russia’s Surveillance State Being Modelled on the West?, New Russian anti-encryption and da-
ta retention laws look sadly familiar. Jul. 22, 2016, reason.com, available at: 
https://reason.com/archives/2016/07/22/is-russias-surveillance-state-being-mode/print (down-
loaded: April 30, 2017), and the “Russia's State Duma just approved some of the most repres-
sive laws in post-Soviet history”, Meduza, 24 June 2016, available at: 
https://meduza.io/en/feature/2016/06/24/russia-s-state-duma-just-approved-some-of-the-most-
repressive-laws-in-post-soviet-history(access: August 18, 2017) 
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tor in many areas. This means a specific relationship and association (e.g. econ-
omy factors, reliability issues, availability of development capacities, and involve-
ment of international corporate actors). 
— A specific technology industry
27
 has been built to provide those surveillance and 
lawful interception technologies, which are expected to be developed. The related 
market publication
28
 defines "„global lawful interception market is expected to gar-
ner $2.1 billion by 2020”. This specific market area targets the governments and 
security organizations with its lawful interception/ surveillance solutions. Concern-
ing the technological developments, besides the traditional solutions, the cyber 
space is one of the most important segments. The market is rapidly growing and 
this is expectedly will continue. One of the reasons of the development is that 
more and more countries in the world are using industry-specific solutions for 
"lawful interception". Because of the fight against terrorism and the spread of cy-
bercrime, the countries and governments are modifying their legal environment, 
and thus they have the opportunity to apply such advanced technology solutions. 
— Concerning the encryption issue, it is a subject of international debates that, in 
spite of the need for strong encryption, there is also a huge demand to resolve the 
issue that the law enforcement or national security services would have access to 
the data they need. Based on the reviewed source, the disputes concern the se-
curity vs. private life. In the literatures, it stated that, on the one hand, the en-
forcement of new technical solutions serves the increase of security; but on the 
other hand, some civil actors may also perceive a potential threat to privacy. 
— Encouraging the encryption, as a study
29
 reveals, "remains strong in international 
and EU forums" and also a 2017 report
30
 emphasizes protection of individuals' 
online security. On the political level, it appears among the dominant thoughts, 
supporting strong encryption standards with regard to the privacy of members of 
civil society. However, the European terrorist acts of recent years have brought 
again the issue to the focus of attention. In 2012, a related UN publication have al-
ready put, that terrorists may use the Internet for preparatory secret communica-
tion, and they "have become increasingly sophisticated at exploiting communica-
                                                 
27
In general, it can be stated that the different intelligence technologies basically are not different from 
the technologies used in the "civil" environment. These cannot be separated from the development of 
technical environment, and the differences can be searched related to their intended purpose and their 
specific applications. 
28
See: https://www.alliedmarketresearch.com/lawful-interception-market  
29
See: Mirja GUTHEIL, Quentin LIGER, Aurélie HEETMAN, James EAGER, Max CRAWFORD: Legal 
Frameworks for Hacking by Law Enforcement: Identification, Evaluation and Comparison of Practices, 
European Union, 2017, p.18.  
30
UN General Assembly, A/HRC/35/22, 30 March 2017, Human Rights Council Thirty-fifth session 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion 
and expression, p.6. available at: https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G17/077/46/PDF/G1707746.pdf?OpenElement (access: August 17, 2017) 
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tions technologies for anonymous communication related to the planning of terror-
ist acts."
31
 
The question is that, if the concerned governments and their organizations are not 
able to access to the decrypted communications directly then what kind of other 
lawful possibilities do they have to get the information they need? The law en-
forcement organizations therefore could turn to different hacking techniques in the 
ICT area.
32
 Looking at the processes of recent years, it is clear that such kind of 
specific techniques start to become determinant in the field of law enforcement (or 
even national security) gathering of information. 
Besides the legislative procedures, often come up the questions, that who develop 
these new surveillance techniques
33
 and methods. In the European scene neither 
all governments, nor their law enforcement or intelligence / security services have 
capabilities to develop such techniques.  
— The security agencies have searched for new, legally applicable solutions, tech-
nical options as they also have taken steps to change the legal environment to 
ensure their monitoring and control capabilities. Legislative changes of the inter-
national scene over the past period have served increasingly this process and its 
efficiency. 
 
 
                                                 
31
The use of the Internet for terrorist purposes, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna, UN, 
September 2012., 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Use_of_Internet_for_Terrorist_Purposes.pdf 10.p 
32
The mentioned study (Mirja Gutheil, Quentin Liger, Aurélie Heetman, James Eager, Max Crawford: 
Legal Frameworks for Hacking by Law Enforcement: Identification, Evaluation and Comparison of 
Practices, European Union, 2017) dealing with the "hacking" issue in lawful interception, defines that 
France, Germany, Poland and the UK have already adopted specific legislative provisions and in Italy, 
and in Netherlands these are in process. The study also points out that: 
- In France in the middle of 2016, the law enforcement agencies were allowed to have remote 
access to computers and other devices. 
- In Italy, the law enforcement has been using the hacking practices for years, and in February 
2017 a new legislative bill draft was presented.  
- In Poland, the law enforcement agencies (according the amendments to the Police Act) have 
„the power of covert access to information systems”, since 2016. 
- In Netherlands, also is in progress the Computer Crime III Bill, (as called Hacking Law) which 
„aims to regulate the use of hacking as an investigative power…”.  
- In France, the authorities „have developed in-house tools for remote access. However, as tech-
nical investigative tools must be legally authorized, this process took time.” 
33
We can see the Germany example where „BKA no longer purchases external hacking expertise but 
intends to develop its own tools”, what’s more the Ministry of Interior established a new authority for 
provision of technical skills and expertise. In Italy the draft law „states that trojans must be operated by 
in-house personnel and not private contractors.” (See: Legal Frameworks for Hacking by Law En-
forcement: Identification, Evaluation and Comparison of Practices, European Union, 2017) 
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CONCLUSIONS 
— The widespread use of advanced infocommunication tools (smartphones, computing 
devices) during the illegal activities affect the development of surveillance directions 
and methods. Governments necessarily use the new information methods and in the 
fight for security, can no longer rule out the application of these technologies.  
— The secret information gathering organizations, whether they are national security 
services or law enforcement agencies are forced to be in constant development by the 
evolving info communication environment. All these can be traced in the legislative de-
bates and processes as well. Nevertheless, it is the task of the governments to find the 
balance between upholding the right to privacy and promoting the security of the socie-
ty. 
— The meanings of the boundaries are re-evaluated by the role of cyberspace and by the 
presence of multinational telecoms providers. It became possible (for national security 
services) to provide information and data collection safely from a remote area.  
— The globalizing infocommunication environment has more and more important impact 
on the methods of technical nature information gathering and on intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies. According the Global Trends
34
 publication of US National Intel-
ligence Council, „the widespread use of new communications technologies will be-
come a double-edged sword for governance.” and the „technologies will provide gov-
ernments - both authoritarian and democratic - an unprecedented ability to monitor 
their citizens.”  
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